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Abstract. We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the max k-cut game,
where we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a
set {1, . . . , k} of k colors. Nodes represent players and edges capture their
mutual interests. The strategy set of each player v consists of the k colors.
When players select a color they induce a k-coloring or simply a coloring.
Given a coloring, the utility (or payoff ) of a player u is the sum of the
weights of the edges {u, v} incident to u, such that the color chosen by u
is different from the one chosen by v. Such games form some of the basic
payoff structures in game theory, model lots of real-world scenarios with
selfish agents and extend or are related to several fundamental classes of
games.
Very little is known about the existence of strong equilibria in max k-cut
games. In this paper we make some steps forward in the comprehension
of it. We first show that improving deviations performed by minimal
coalitions can cycle, and thus answering negatively the open problem
proposed in [13]. Next, we turn our attention to unweighted graphs. We
first show that any optimal coloring is a 5-SE in this case. Then, we
introduce x-local strong equilibria, namely colorings that are resilient to
deviations by coalitions such that the maximum distance between every
pair of nodes in the coalition is at most x. We prove that 1-local strong
equilibria always exist. Finally, we show the existence of strong Nash
equilibria in several interesting specific scenarios.
1 Introduction
We consider the max k-cut game. This is played on an undirected edge-weighted
graph where the n nodes correspond to the players and the edges capture their
mutual interests. The strategy space of each player is a set {1, . . . , k} of k avail-
able colors (we assume that the colors are the same for each player). When
players select a color they induce a k-coloring or simply a coloring. Given a col-
oring, the utility (or payoff ) of a player u is the sum of the weights of edges
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{u, v} incident to u, such that the color chosen by u is different from the one
chosen by v. The objective of every player is to maximize its own utility.
This class of games forms some of the basic payoff structures in game theory,
and can model lots of real-life scenarios. Consider, for example, a set of companies
that have to decide which product to produce in order to maximize their revenue.
Each company has its own competitors (for example the ones that are in the same
region), and it is reasonable to assume that each company wants to minimize
the number of competitors that produce the same product. Another possible
scenario is in a radio setting; radio towers are players and their goal is selecting
a frequency such that neighboring radio-towers have a different one in order to
minimize the interference.
In such games on graphs it is beneficial for each player to anti-coordinate
its choices with the ones of its neighbors (i.e., selecting a different color). As a
consequence, the players may attempt to increase their utility by coordinating
their choices in groups (also called coalitions). Therefore, in our studies we focus
on equilibrium concepts that are resilient to deviations of groups. Along this
direction, a very classic notion of equilibrium is the strong Nash equilibrium (SE)
[2] that is a coloring in which no coalition, taking the actions of its complements
as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits all of its members,
in the sense that every player of the coalition strictly improves its utility. The
notion of SE is a very strong equilibrium concept. A weaker one is the notion of
q-Strong Equilibrium (q-SE), for some q ≤ n, where only coalitions of at most
q players are allowed to cooperatively change their strategies. Notice that the
1-SE is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium (NE), while the n-SE is equivalent
to the SE.
When it exists, an SE is a very robust state of the game and it is also
more sustainable than an NE. However, while NE always exists in these games
[8,15,18], little is known about the existence of strong equilibria in Max k-cut
games. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, there are basically two papers of
the literature dealing with such issue. In [12] the authors show that an optimal
strategy profile (or optimal coloring), i.e., a coloring that maximizes the sum of
the players’ utilities or equivalently, a coloring that maximizes the k-cut, is an SE
for the max 2-cut game, and it is a 3-SE, for the max k-cut game, for any k ≥ 2.
Moreover, they further show that an optimal strategy profile is not necessarily a
4-SE, for any k ≥ 3. In [13] they show that, if the number of colors is at least the
number of players minus two, then an optimal strategy profile is an SE. Finally,
they show that the dynamics, where at each step a coalition can deviate so that
all of its members strictly improve their utility by changing strategy, can cycle.
The main consequence of this latter fact is that no strong potential function4
can exist for the game, and hence the existence of an SE cannot be proved by
simply exhibiting it. It is worth noticing that strong potential functions are one
of the main tools used to prove the existence of an SE.
All the above results suggest that it is hard to understand whether SE always
exist for max k-cut games. In this paper, although we do not prove or disprove
4 See Section 2 for the definition of strong potential function.
that every instance of the max k-cut game possesses a strong equilibrium, we
make some step forward in the comprehension of it.
Our results. As pointed out in [13], sometimes the existence of an SE is proved
by means of a potential function in which the set of deviating coalitions is re-
stricted to minimal coalitions only, where a coalition is minimal if none of its
proper subsets can perform an improvement themselves (see for example [14]).
Understanding whether this approach can be used in the max k-cut game is
mentioned as an open problem in [13]. We answer this question negatively (see
Proposition 2) by showing an instance in which there is a cycle of improving
deviations performed by minimal coalitions only.
We then focus on the unweighted case, where the utility of a player in a
coloring is simply the number of neighbors with different color from its own, and
we provide some non-trivial existential results for it. In particular, in Section 4
we show that 5-SE always exist for the max k-cut game. This is an improvement
with respect to the existence of 3-SE [12].
Besides q-SE, we also consider another equilibrium concept that is weaker
than the notion of SE. Observe that in a q-SE two players can form a coalition
even if they are far from each other in the graph. This is unrealistic in many
practical scenarios. In oder to encompass this aspect, in Section 5, we introduce
the concept of x-Local SE (x-LSE). A coloring is an x-LSE if it is resilient to
deviations by coalitions such that the shortest path between every pair of nodes
in the coalition is long at most x. Therefore, the notion of x-LSE also takes
into account that certain players may not have the possibility of communicating
to each other and thus to form a coalition. This seems an important point to
consider when modeling a situation of strategic interaction between agents. Here
we suppose that the input graph also represents knowledge between players, that
is two nodes know each other if they are connected by an edge. In this paper we
focus on the case x = 1, that is each player in the coalition must have a social
connection (namely an edge) towards every deviating player. We show that, for
any k, a 1-LSE always exists. Interestingly enough, our analysis also provides a
characterization of the set of local strong equilibria which relates 1-LSE to q-SE.
Finally, in Section 6, we show that an SE always exists for some special classes
of unweighted graphs. More precisely, in Corollary 1, we prove that in graphs
with large girth, any optimal strategy profile is an SE, for any k ≥ 2. Moreover,
in Proposition 9, we prove that whenever the number of colors k is large enough
with respect to the maximum degree of the graph, then any optimal strategy
profile is an SE.
Some proofs have been moved to the appendix.
Further related work. The max k-cut game has been first investigated in
[15,18], where the authors show that, when the graph is unweighted and undi-
rected, it is possible to compute a Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time by
exploiting the potential function method. When the graph is weighted undi-
rected, even if the potential function ensures the existence of NE the problem
of computing an equilibrium is PLS-complete even for k = 2 [22]. In fact, for
such a value of k, it coincides with the classical max cut game. In [8] the authors
show the existence of NE in generalized max k-cut games where players also
have an extra profit depending on the chosen color. When the graph is directed,
the max k-cut game in general does not admit a potential function. Indeed, in
this case, even the problem of understanding whether they admit a Nash equi-
librium is NP-complete for any fixed k ≥ 2 [18]. In [7], the authors present a
randomized polynomial time algorithm that computes a constant approximate
Nash equilibrium for a large class of directed unweighted graphs.
Studies on the performance of Nash equilibria and strong Nash equilibria can
be found in [8,15,18] and in [11,12,13], respectively.
A related stream of research considers coordination games. The idea is that
agents are rewarded for choosing common strategies in order to capture the
influences. Apt et al. [1] propose a coordination game modeled as an undirected
graph where nodes are players and each player has a list of allowed colors. Given
a coloring, an agent has a payoff equal to the number of adjacent nodes with
its same color. The authors show that NE and 2-SE always exists, and give an
example in which no 3-SE exists. Moreover, they prove that strong equilibria
exist for various special cases.
Panagopoulou and Spirakis [21] study games where Nash equilibria are proper
node coloring in undirected unweighted graphs setting. In particular, they con-
sider the game where each agent v has to choose a color among k available ones
and its payoff is equal to the number of nodes in the graph that have chosen
its same color, unless some neighbor of v has chosen the same color, and in this
case the payoff of v is 0. They prove that this is a potential game and that a
Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Max k-cut games are related to many other fundamental games considered in
the scientific literature. One example is given by the graphical games introduced
in [17]. In these games the payoff of each agent depends only on the strategies of
its neighbors in a given social knowledge graph defined over the set of the agents,
where an arc (i, j) means that j influences i’s payoff. Max k-cut games can also
be seen as a particular hedonic game (see [3] for a nice introduction to hedonic
games) with an upper bound (i.e., k) to the number of coalitions. Specifically,
given a k-coloring, the agents with the same color can be seen as members of
the same coalition of the hedonic game. In order to get the equivalence among
the two games, the hedonic utility of an agent v can be defined as the overall
number of its neighbors minus the number of agents of its neighborhood that are
in the same coalition. Nash equilibria issues in hedonic games have been largely
investigated under several different assumptions [5,6,20] (just to cite a few).
Concerning local coalitions, a notion of equilibrium close in spirit to our
LSE has been studied in the context of network design games in [19]. Moreover,
locality aspects have been also considered when restricting the strategy space in
single-player deviations (see for example [4,10]).
Finally, it is worth mentioning the classical optimization max cut problem,
a very famous problem in graph theory that was proven to be NP-Hard by
Karp [16].
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E,w) be an undirected weighted graph, where |V | = n, |E| = m,
and w : E → R+. Let δv(G) =
∑
u∈V :{v,u}∈E w({v, u}) denote the degree of
v, that is the sum of the weights of all the edges incident to v. Let δM (G) =
maxv∈V δv(G) denotes the maximum degree in G. Given a set of nodes V ′ ⊆ V ,
let G(V ′) = (V ′, E′, w) be the subgraph induced by V ′, where E′ = {{v, u} ∈
E | v ∈ V ′ ∧ u ∈ V ′}. For any pair of nodes v, u ∈ V , the distance distG(v, u)
between v and u in G is equal to the length of the shortest path from v to u5.
Given G and a set of colors K = {1, . . . k}, the max k-cut problem is to
partition the vertices into k subsets V1, . . . , Vk such that the sum of the weights
of the edges having the endpoints in different sets is maximized. A strategic
version of the max k-cut problem is the max k-cut game, and it is defined as
follows. There are |V | players, and each node of G is controlled by exactly one
rational player. Players have the same strategy set, and it is equal to the set
of colors {1, . . . k}. A strategy profile, or coloring σ : V → K, is a labeling of
nodes of G in which each player v is colored σ(v). Given a coloring σ, let E(σ) =
{{u, v} : σ(u) 6= σ(v)} be the edges that are proper with respect to σ, and let
δiu(σ) =
∑
v∈V w({u, v})σ(v)=i be the sum of the weights of the edges incident to
u and towards nodes colored i in σ. The utility (or payoff) of player u is defined
as µu(σ) =
∑
v∈V :{u,v}∈E∧σ(u)6=σ(v) w({u, v}). The cut-value, or size of the cut,
of a coloring S(σ) is defined as follows: S(σ) =
∑
{u,v}∈E∧σ(u)6=σ(v) w({u, v}).
The social welfare of a coloring σ is defined as the sum of players’ utilities, that
is SW (σ) =
∑
v∈V µv(σ) = 2S(σ). Moreover, an optimal strategy profile (or
optimal coloring) is defined to be a strategy profile which maximizes the sum of
the players’ utilities and thus the cut-value.
Given a coalition C ⊆ V and a coloring σ, let CK(σ) = {i ∈ K | ∃ v ∈
C s.t. σ(v) = i} be the set of colors used by the coalition C in σ. Moreover, for
each color i, let Ci(σ) = {v ∈ C | σ(v) = i} be the set of players in C that are
colored i in σ.
Given a strategy profile σ, a player v and a coalition C, we denote by σ−v
and σ−C the strategy profile σ besides the strategy played by v and by C,
respectively. Moreover, we denote by σC the coloring σ restricted only to players
in C, and we use (σ−v, σ(v)) and (σ−C , σC) to denote σ.
A profile σ is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if no player can improve its payoff by
deviating unilaterally from σ, that is, µv(σ−v, i) ≤ µv(σ) for each player v ∈ V
and for each color i ∈ K. For each 1 ≤ q ≤ n, σ is a q-Strong Equilibrium
(q-SE) if there exists no coalition C with |C| ≤ q that can cooperatively deviate
from σC to σ′C in such a way that every player in C strictly improves its utility
in (σ−C , σ′C). The 1-strong equilibrium is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium,
while for q = n an n-strong equilibrium is called strong equilibrium (SE). When
a coalition C deviates so that all of its members strictly improve their utility,
then we say it performs a strong improvement. A strong improvement is said
5 Even if the graph is weighted, we consider here the hop-distance, where the length
of a path is defined as the number of its edges.
to be minimal if no proper subsets of the deviating coalition can perform an
improvement themselves, and the coalition itself is said to be minimal. A strong
improving dynamics (shortly dynamics) is a sequence of strong improving moves.
A game is said to be convergent if, given any initial state, any sequence of
improving moves leads to a strong Nash equilibrium. Given a coloring σ, if a
coalition C induces a new coloring σ′ after deviating, then we say that the set
of edges E(σ′)\E(σ) enters the cut, and that the set of edges E(σ)\E(σ′) leaves
the cut.
A potential function Φ is a function mapping strategy profiles into real values
in such a way that, for each coloring σ and each player v, whenever v can
profitably deviate from σ yielding a new coloring σ′, it holds that Φ(σ′) > Φ(σ).
When this is true also for profitably deviations performed by coalitions, the
function is called strong potential function.
We conclude this section by stating some properties about minimal coalitions
that will be useful later. The proofs of these properties can be found in the
appendix.
Proposition 1. Let σ be a coloring, and let C be a minimal coalition that can
perform a strong improvement from σ. Let σ′ be the resulting coloring. Then,
the following properties hold: (i) CK(σ) = CK(σ′); and (ii) if G(C) is acyclic,
then changing from σ to σ′ strictly increases the size of the cut.
3 Non-existence of a minimal strong potential function
Fig. 1: Instance for which the strong improvement dynamics cycles.
In this section we focus on weighted graphs and, as discussed in the intro-
duction, we close an open problem stated by Gourvès and Monnot in [13] by
providing an instance in which there is a cycle of improving deviations per-
formed by minimal coalitions only. More specifically, the loop is composed by
the deviation of a clique, followed by four improvements performed by single
players.
Proposition 2. No strong potential function exists for the max k-cut game,
even if only minimal coalitions are allowed to deviate.
Proof. Consider the graph G and the coloring σ depicted in Figure 1, where, if
a node v is contained in the dashed ellipse labeled i, then v is colored i in σ, and
where M and ε denote a very large and small positive value, respectively.
Consider coalition C = {a, b, d, g} and consider the deviation σ′ where σ′(a) =
2, σ′(b) = 3, σ′(d) = 1, σ′(g) = 1. It is easy to check that this deviation is prof-
itable for players in C. In fact, they all improve their utility by ε.
Player a has utility 3+M in σ, and since it has an edge of weightM towards
node i having color 3, a can only deviate to color 2. Hence, a strictly improves
its utility from 3 +M to 3 +M + ε only if node d changes color. Analogously,
in σ, d has one edge of weight M towards node h having color 3. Thus, d can
only switch to color 1 and this is convenient for it only if both a and b leave
color 1. If this happens, d’s utility increases by at least ε. Similarly to a, player
b deviates to color 3 only if player g switches to color 1, and this happens only if
both a and b deviates too. To sum up, both d and g deviate if and only if a and b
deviate too. Thus, C is minimal. Note that edge {d, g} becomes monochromatic,
but d and g’s new payoffs make the deviation worth it anyway, since they both
increase their utility by ε.
After the players in C jointly deviate from σ, player a, who is now colored 2,
can go back to color 1, improving its utility from 3+ε+M to 4+M . Because of
a’s deviation, d’s utility goes down to 1/2+ 4ε+M . Thus, it goes back to color
2, achieving 1+ ε+M . Also g, whose utility is now 1/2+ ε+M , deviates to its
old color in σ, that is color 3, and it gets 1/2 + 3ε+M . In this configuration b’
utility is 5/2+ 3ε+M . Thus going back to color 1 its utility improves to 3+M
and we are now back to the initial configuration σ.
4 The existence of a 5-SE in unweighted graphs
From now on we will focus on unweighted graphs. In [12] it is shown that in
the weighted case, any optimal strategy profile is always a 3-SE, and there are
weighted graphs in which every optimal coloring is not a 4-SE. In this section
we improve this result for unweighted graphs, by showing that a 5-SE always
exists. This also establishes a separation between the weighted and unweighted
case. In particular, we show that by performing minimal strong improvements
with coalitions of size at most five, the cut value increases. It implies that the
cut value is a potential function and thus the dynamics converges to 5-SE. We
start by showing a simple lemma that is used in the rest of the section.
Lemma 1. Let σ be an NE and let C be a minimal coalition which would profit
by deviating from σ to σ′. If there exists two players u, x ∈ C such that:
(i) σ(u) 6= σ(x)
(ii) σ′(u) = σ(x)
(iii) {y ∈ C|{u, y} ∈ E, σ(y) = σ(x)} = {x}
then δσ(u)u (σ) = δσ
′(u)
u (σ). Moreover, if there exists a third player v ∈ C such
that σ(v) 6= σ(x) and σ′(v) = σ(x), then {u, v} /∈ E.
Proof. Since σ is an NE we know that u cannot improve its utility by deviating
alone to σ′(u) which implies:
δσ(u)u (σ) ≤ δσ
′(u)
u (σ).
By (iii) we know that, moving from σ to σ′, the only neighbor of u which
leaves σ′(u) is x which means that its new neighbors colored σ′(u) are at least
δ
σ′(u)
u (σ) − 1, because, a priori, other players could move to the same strategy
in σ′, hence δσ
′(u)
u (σ′) ≥ δσ
′(u)
u (σ) − 1. Moreover, player u strictly improves its
utility, which means δσ
′(u)
u (σ′) < δσ(u)u (σ). Using both inequalities we obtain:
δσ(u)u (σ) > δσ
′(u)
u (σ)− 1.
As a consequence, we have δσ(u)u (σ) ≥ δσ
′(u)
u (σ), and hence δσ(u)u (σ) = δσ
′(u)
u (σ),
which in turn implies in particular that δσ
′(u)
u (σ′) = δσ
′(u)
u (σ)− 1, i.e. u’s utility
improves exactly by one. Thus, given a player v like in the hypothesis, if {u, v} ∈
E then u’s utility would not increase after the deviation.
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 can be used to prove the following proposition,
which shows that when the size of a deviating coalition C is related in a cer-
tain way to the number of colors used by the players in C, then the improving
deviation always increases the size of the cut.
Proposition 3. Let σ be an NE and let C be a minimal coalition which would
profit by deviating from σ to σ′. If |CK(σ)| ∈ {2, |C|−1, |C|}, then the deviation
strictly improves the size of the cut.
Gourvès and Monnot [12] show that in weighted graphs an optimal solution
is always a 3-strong equilibrium, that is, it is resilient to any joint deviation by
at most three players. Proposition 3 already extends this result since it implies
that unweighted graphs admit a potential function when minimal coalitions of
at most four players are allowed to deviate, implying that 4-SE always exists.
We now prove that the cut value is a potential function even when the deviation
is extended to coalitions of size at most five. This implies that a 5-SE always
exists in unweighted graphs.
Theorem 4. Any optimal strategy profile is a 5-SE.
5 Local strong equilibria
In this section we introduce and discuss local strong equilibria. As our main
result, we show that, for any k, such an equilibrium always exists. Interestingly
enough, our analysis also provides a characterization of the set of local strong
equilibria which relates them to q-SE.
Let C ⊆ V be a set of players. We say that C is an x-local coalition if the
distance in G between any two players in C is at most x. Moreover, we define an
x-Local Strong Equilibrium (x-LSE) to be a coloring in which no x-local coalition
can profitably deviate. In this section, we will consider only the case x = 1, that
is, the coalition C induces a clique. We will use LSE in place of 1-LSE.
Let us introduce some additional notation. Given a node u and a strategy
profile σ, we denote by cu(σ) the cost of u in σ, namely the number of neighbors of
u that have the same color of u in σ, i.e. δσ(u)u (σ). Notice that cu(σ) = δu−µu(σ).
Given a coalition C, we also define cu,C(σ) = |{(u, v) ∈ E|v ∈ C, σ(v) = σ(u)}|.
We now prove a technical lemma which gives some necessary conditions for
a clique to deviate profitably from an NE.
Lemma 2. Let σ be an NE. Suppose there exists a deviation σ′ such that all
the members of C can lower their cost changing from σ to σ′. The following
conditions must hold :
(i) |Ci(σ)| = |Ci(σ′)| for all i = 1, . . . , k;
(ii) cu(σ)− cu(σ′) = 1 for all u ∈ C;
(iii) cu(σ) = cu(σ−u, σ′(u)) for all u ∈ C.
The following lemma underlines a very interesting property of deviating
cliques, which allows us to study only cliques formed by at most k players.
Lemma 3. Let C be a clique which profits by deviating from an NE σ to σ′.
Then there exists j ≤ |CK(σ)| and a subcoalition C ′ = {ui, . . . , uj} ⊆ C whose
players can improve their payoffs by deviating alone to the strategy they use in
σ′. Moreover it holds :
(i) σ′(ui) = σ(ui+1) for all i = 1, . . . , j − 1;
(ii) σ′(uj) = σ(u1).
Proof. Consider a player v1 ∈ C and assume without loss of generality that
σ(v1) = 1 and σ′(v1) = 2. By Lemma 2, there is at least one player, say v2, in C
such that σ(v2) = 2. If σ′(v2) = 1, then C ′ = {v1, v2}. Otherwise, call without
loss of generality σ′(v2) = 3. Then, once again by Lemma 2 there is a node in C,
say v3, with σ(v2) = 2. We can iterate this argument until we get a node vh with
` := σ′(vh) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h − 1}. We set C ′ = {v`, v`+1, . . . , vh} and set j = |C ′|.
Notice that C ′ already satisfies the properties 1 and 2 of the statement of the
lemma (observe also that it could be C ′ = C).
Let σ∗ be the strategy profile in which the players in C ′ play as in σ′ while
the others play as in σ. It remains to show that all players in C ′ is improving its
utility by changing from σ to σ∗. Let ν = σ∗(vi). By definition of σ∗, we claim
NE
2-SE
LSE
k-SE
SE
Fig. 2: Equilibria in the unweighted max-k-cut game
that cvi(σ∗) = cvi(σ−vi , ν) − 1. This is true because there is exactly one player
in C ′ that leaves color ν and thus the number of vi’s neighbors with such a color
decreases by 1. Hence,
cvi(σ∗) = cvi(σ−vi , ν)− 1
= cvi(σ−vi , σ′(vi))− 1
= cvi(σ)− 1,
where in the last equality we used property (iii) of Lemma 2 on σ′.
Lemma 3 allows us to prove the main result of this section, which is the
following:
Theorem 5. Any optimal strategy profile is an LSE.
Proof. Let σ be an optimal strategy profile and assume σ is not an LSE. Clearly,
σ is an NE. Then there exists a coalition C = {u1, . . . , uj} of j ≤ k players and
a strategy profile σ′ which satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3. We will show that
the size of the cut increases by exactly j from σ to σ′, which is a contradiction.
First of all, observe that all the edges between players of C are in the cut
both in σ and σ′. Moreover, from property (ii) of Lemma 2, we have that the
utility of each ui ∈ C increases exactly by one. Let Ei = {{ui, v}|v /∈ C}. As a
consequence, we have that, for each ui ∈ C, the number of edges in Ei crossing
the cut increases by exactly one. Since Ei and Ej are disjoint for i 6= j, the size
of the cut increases exactly by j from σ to σ′.
We conclude this section by discussing some consequences of our analysis
about how LSE is related to q-SE: these results are depicted in Figure 2. Some
inclusions are straightforward from the definition of q-SE. Here we show that an
LSE is always a 2-SE and a k-SE is always an LSE. Concerning the former fact,
note that a coalition of 2 players can profitably deviate from an NE σ if and only
if there exists an edge between them. In fact, otherwise, they could profitably
deviate alone from σ. This means that such a coalition is a clique of two players,
and hence a local coalition. As far as the latter relation is concerned, we prove
the following:
Proposition 6. A k-SE is always an LSE.
Proof. Let σ be a k-SE and, by contradiction, let C be a clique which would
profit deviating to σ′. By Lemma 3 there exists a minimal subcoalition C ′ of at
most k players which can profit deviating alone, which is a contradiction.
It is worth noticing that, as a consequence, when k = 2 the set of LSE
coincides exactly with the set of 2-SE. On the other hand, for k ≥ 3 all inclusions
are proper, as we show in Appendix B.
6 Existence of SE for special cases
In this section we show that an SE always exists for some special classes of
unweighted graphs. More precisely, we prove that in graphs with large girth or
large degree, any optimal strategy profile is an SE. It is worth noticing that,
for general graphs, we have already proved that any optimal coloring is both a
5-SE and an LSE. We conjecture that it is indeed always an SE, even if this
seems to be challenging to prove in general. A natural approach could be that
of using the size of the cut as a strong potential function, that is ΦS(σ) = S(σ),
as it has already been done for proving that max k-cut games admit a Nash
equilibrium [15] [18]. However, it can be argued that this approach cannot work
in general, since a profitable coalition deviation could sometimes result in a cut-
value decrease. This is stated in the following proposition whose proof can be
found in the appendix.
Proposition 7. The size of the cut is not a strong potential function for the
max k-cut game on unweighted graphs.
Even though there exist strong improvements that can decrease ΦS , it does
not mean that such function cannot be used in some interesting special setting.
Indeed, there are cases in which ΦS ’s value always increases after a strong im-
provement, that is, they admit a strong potential function. From now on we
assume that only minimal coalitions can deviate.
Bounded girth Given a graph G, let ρ(G) be its girth, that is the size of the
minimum cycle. We show that a graph with girth ρ(G) always admits a q-SE,
for q ≤ 2ρ(G)−3. This implies that when ρ(G) ≥ (|V |+ 3) /2 then there always
exists a strong equilibrium.
Proposition 8. Given an unweighted graph G with girth ρ(G) and any number
of colors k, an optimal coloring is a (2ρ(G)− 3)-SE.
Corollary 1. If ρ(G) ≥ (|V |+ 3) /2, then an optimal coloring is always an SE.
Bounded degree Here we show that whenever the number of colors k is large
enough with respect to the maximum degree of the graph, then any optimal
strategy profile is an SE. More precisely, we prove the following:
Proposition 9. Any optimal strategy profile is an SE when k ≥ ⌈(δM + 1) /2⌉.
Proof. Let σ∗ be an optimal strategy profile and assume σ∗ is not an SE. Then
a coalition C and a strategy profile σ′ exist such that all players in C strictly
improves their utility by deviating to σ′. We will show that in this case the size
of the cut will strictly increase in σ′, which contradicts the optimality of σ∗.
As we already pointed out, σ∗ is NE. Moreover, consider any node u. Since
its degree δu is at most δM ≤ 2k − 1, we have that in any coloring, by the
pigeonhole principle, there must exist a color that appears at most once in u’s
neighborhood. As a consequence, since σ∗ is an NE, it holds that µu(σ∗) ≥ δu−1.
On the other hand, since all nodes in C must strictly improve their utility, we
have that, for every u ∈ C, µu(σ∗) = δu − 1 and µu(σ′) = δu. This implies
that the size of the cut must strictly increase. Indeed, consider the edge set
F = {{u, v}|u ∈ C or v ∈ C}. Clearly, only edges in F can enter or leave the
cut when the strategy profile changes from σ∗ to σ′. Moreover, all edges in F
belong to the cut E(σ′) while there is at least an edge that is not in E(σ∗).
7 Conclusions and future work
We investigated coalition resilient equilibria in the max k-cut game. We solved
an open problem proposed in [13] on weighted graphs by showing that improving
deviations performed by minimal coalitions can cycle. We then provided some
positive results on unweighted graphs. More precisely, we proved that any opti-
mal coloring is both a 5-SE and a 1-LSE. We also showed that SE exist for some
special cases, namely, when the graph has a large girth or the number of colors
is large enough with respect to the maximum degree.
Even though we made a progress on the topic, the problem of understanding
whether any instance of the max k-cut game admits strong equilibria is still
open on both weighted and unweighted graphs. We conjecture that an optimal
strategy profile is always an SE in the unweighted case. However, proving that
seems to be really challenging. Another possible way to prove the existence of
an SE would be that of providing a strong potential function. We proved in
Proposition 2 that such function cannot exist on weighted graphs even when
only minimal coalitions can deviate but it is still unknown whether a strong
potential function exists or not on unweighted graphs. Along this direction, an
interesting intermediate step could be that of proving the existence of q-SE for
possibly non-constant values of q > 5.
Regarding x-local coalitions, our results are only about the case x = 1 on
unweighted graphs. Some other research questions could be the study of the
existence of x-local strong equilibrium for x > 1, and how to extend our results
to weighted graphs. For instance, it would be interesting to investigate whether
any instance of the max k-cut game on weighted graphs admits local strong
equilibria.
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Appendix A: omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us start with the proof of property (i). In order to prove the equality we
show that CK(σ′) ⊆ CK(σ) and CK(σ) ⊆ CK(σ′).
– if v ∈ C and σ′(v) /∈ CK(σ), then it is easy to see that v can deviate alone
and this is a contradiction with the fact that C is minimal;
– if there is a color i ∈ CK(σ)\CK(σ′), then again it is easy to see that the
coalition C\Ci(σ) can perform a strong improvement and this is a contra-
diction with the fact that C is minimal.
In order to prove property (ii), we first show the following lemma that will
subsequently be used.
Lemma 4. In undirected weighted graphs any acyclic coalition C, with |C| > 2,
that can perform a minimal strong improvement must be placed in no more than
two colors, that is |CK(σ)| ≤ 2.
Proof. Given a minimal acyclic coalition C, if σ′ is the resulting coloring after C
deviates, we know from property (i) that CK(σ′) = CK(σ). We build a directed
graph G′ = (C,E′) where an edge (v, u) is in E′ if and only if (i) {v, u} ∈ E,
(ii) σ′(v) = σ(u), and (iii) if u does not change color, then v has no interest
in deviating, that is, µv(σ′) − w({v, u}) ≤ µv(σ). In other words, the node v
has interest in changing color only if also node u changes color. G′ represents
all those moves that are mandatory in order to make the deviation profitable
to every player in C. Since C performs a minimal strong improvement, every
player v ∈ C must have at least one ingoing edge and one outgoing edge, since
otherwise v could be removed from C, i.e., there exists a sub coalition of C not
containing v that can perform a strong improvement, or v could deviate alone,
respectively. This implies the existence of at least one oriented cycle in G′, and
consequently the existence of a cycle in G(C) too. Since we know that G(C)
is acyclic, the only type of cycle that can happen in G′ is the one limited to
adjacent vertices, and this happens only when the number of colors used by C
is at most 2.
Lemma 4 says that a minimal coalition C must use at most two colors when
G(C) is acyclic. If |CK(σ)| = 1 then |C| = 1 by the minimality condition,
and we already know that the cut-value always strictly increases after a Nash
improvement [9]. If |CK(σ)| = 2 we know from [12] that each strong improvement
performed by a coalition that uses only two colors (i.e., the classical max cut
problem) always increases the size of the cut.
Proof of Proposition 3
By hypothesis we know that |CK(σ)| ∈ {2, |C|−1, |C|}. Let us consider the three
cases in detail:
– |CK(σ)| = 2. This result derives from [12], which shows that in the max cut
game (i.e., k = 2), any strong improvement always strictly increases the size
of the cut.
– |CK(σ)| = |C|. For each color i ∈ CK(σ) there is a unique player u ∈
C such that σ(u) = i. By Proposition 1, property (i), we know that no
pair of players can share the same color in σ′, since otherwise C would not
be minimal. Moreover, for each player u ∈ C it holds by Lemma 1 that
δ
σ(u)
u (σ) = δσ
′(u)
u (σ), namely the number of edges that leave the cut is equal
to the number of edges towards non-deviating players that enter the cut. In
addition, since players’ utilities must increase there must be at least |C| − 1
more edges in the cut than the one in σ, that is the cut-value increases.
– |CK(σ)| = |C| − 1. There must be exactly two vertices colored the same in
σ, let them be u and v. Analogously, in σ′ there must be exactly two nodes
colored the same too, let them be x and y. There are three possible cases:
• u = x and v = y, that is u and v stay together in both σ and σ′. If
{u, v} /∈ E, then by Lemma 1 |CK(σ)| = |C|, δσ(u)u (σ) = δσ
′(u)
u (σ) and
δ
σ(v)
v (σ) = δσ
′(v)
v (σ) and similarly to the case |CK(σ)| = |C|, u and v
provide a new edge each to the cut which increases its size. Conversely,
if {u, v} ∈ E then again by Lemma 1 at least one player among u and
v does not improve its utility after the deviation, thus C is not a strong
improvement.
• u 6= x and v 6= y, that is in σ′ two new nodes x, y ∈ C share the same
color, while u and v are now separated. If {x, y} ∈ E, then this edge
leaves the cut in σ′. If x and y switch to a color from which only one player
deviates, then by Lemma 1 their utility do not strictly increase. Thus, it
must necessarily be that x and y benefit from the deviation of at least
two players, and the only chance is u and v. Therefore, σ′(x) = σ′(y) =
σ(u) = σ(v), and {x, u}, {x, v}, {y, u}, {y, v} ∈ E. In order to strictly
increase x and y’s utility it must be that δσ(x)x = δσ(u)x and δσ(x)y = δσ(u)y ,
because they earn two edges and they lose edge {x, y}. Moreover, we
know from Lemma 1 that δσ(u)u = δσ
′(u)
u and δσ(u)v = δσ
′(v)
v . So, four new
edges enter the cut and edge {x, y} leaves the cut, that is the cut-value
increases. Conversely, if {x, y} /∈ E, then the potential increases in a way
similarly to the one described in the previous case.
• One node among u and v, say u, shares color σ′(u) with another node
x ∈ C. It must be that {u, x} /∈ E otherwise, by Lemma 1, x would have
no desire to deviate. Thus, the cut-value must increase.
Proof of Theorem 4
We will argue that any improving deviation performed by a coalition of size at
most 5 strictly increases the size of the cut.
Let C = {u, v, w, x, y} be a minimal coalition of size five that can deviate
from a stable coloring σ inducing coloring σ′. We already know from Proposition
3 that when C is placed in either two, four or five colors in σ, then any of its
minimal improvement always increases the cut-value. Thus, the remaining case
is when |CK(σ)| = 3. Let the colors used be 1, 2, and 3. Let us consider how the
nodes in C are located in σ.
First, there could be three nodes u, v, w sharing the same color 1, while nodes
x and y are colored 2 and 3, respectively. Since u, v and w have to choose which
color to deviate among 2 and 3, at least two of them have to be colored the same
in σ′ too. Let us assume without loss of generality that u an v share the same
color in σ′. If {u, v} ∈ E, then by Lemma 1 they do not improve their utility
because they benefit from the deviation of only one player. This implies that the
nodes in {u, v, w} that are colored the same in σ′ cannot have any edge between
them. Moreover, if one of the three nodes, say w, deviates to the same color as
another player of the coalition, say x, then {w, x} /∈ E again by Lemma 1. Thus,
the potential value increases for such configuration.
The other case is when two nodes u, v are colored 1, two nodes w, x are
colored 2 and the fifth node y is colored 3. Let us analyze how the players in C
can be located in σ′ after the deviation.
– There are three nodes paired together and two nodes alone. The triplet must
necessarily be composed by a pair of nodes that are paired together also in
σ, let them be u, v, plus a third node. The number of edges in the subgraph
induced by such triplet is at most one. In fact, there is a player in such
subgraph with degree 2 then, since it benefits from the deviation of at most
two players and σ is stable, its utility does not increase after the deviation.
Moreover, there are two players in C that are alone in σ′, that is they add
at least one edge each to the cut. Therefore, at most one edge leaves the cut
and at least two edges enters the cut, namely Φ increases.
– There are two pairs of nodes together, and a node alone. If the node alone
is y in both σ and σ′, then the two pairs of nodes in σ′ must be the same
in σ, that is σ′(u) = σ′(v) and σ′(w) = σ′(x). One of the two pairs, say
u, v deviates to σ(y), that is it benefits only from the deviation of y, and
by Lemma 1 this implies that {u, v} /∈ E. The other pair w, x deviates to
σ(u), and if {w, x} ∈ E it implies a deviation similar to the one described in
Proposition 3 for |CK(σ)| = |C| − 1, case 2, and we know that such type of
deviation increases the cut-value. If {w, x} /∈ E, then the cut-value increases
similarly to Proposition 3, case 1 of |CK(σ)| = |C| − 1. Conversely, suppose
that y is now paired with another node, say u. If {y, u} ∈ E then in order
to make player y deviate profitably, it must have two edges {y, w}, {y, x}
towards color σ(w), and it must be that σ′(y) = σ(w). As described in
previous cases, this kind of deviation increases the cut-value. If {y, u} /∈ E,
then by Lemma 1 y and u add at least two edges to the cut. The other
pair is necessarily colored σ(y), that is the two players benefit only from y’s
deviation. Lemma 1 implies that they cannot have an edge among them,
therefore the edges in the cut increases.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let u ∈ C be a node in the coalition and let ν = σ′(u) be the new color of u.
We claim that
0 < cu(σ)− cu(σ′) ≤ cu,C(σ−u, ν)− cu,C(σ′) (1)
Indeed, first notice that u strictly decreases its cost deviating to σ′, and hence
cu(σ′) < cu(σ). Moreover, since σ is an NE we also have that cu(σ) ≤ cu(σ−u, ν).
As a direct consequence we get the following double inequality:
0 < cu(σ)− cu(σ′) ≤ cu(σ−u, ν)− cu(σ′).
Since the players outside the coalition do not change their colors, it holds that
(cu(σ′) − cu,C(σ′)) = (cu(σ−u, ν) − cu,C(σ−u, ν)). And hence we have cu(σ′) =
cu(σ−u, ν)− cu,C(σ−u, ν) + cu,C(σ′), which implies:
cu(σ−u, ν)− cu(σ′) =
= cu(σ−u, ν)− (cu(σ−u, ν)− cu,C(σ−u, ν) + cu,C(σ′)) =
= cu,C(σ−u, ν)− cu,C(σ′).
Replacing this expression in the double inequality we have derived before, we
get Equation (1).
Since C is a clique and σ′(u) = ν we know also that cu,C(σ′) = |Cν(σ′)| − 1
while cu,C(σ−u, ν) = |Cν(σ)|. Replacing these terms in Equation (1) we obtain:
0 < cu(σ)− cu(σ′) ≤ |Cν(σ)| − |Cν(σ′)|+ 1 (2)
which implies that |Cν(σ′)| ≤ |Cν(σ)|. The arguments used so far hold for any
player u ∈ C, and thus the above inequality also holds that for all colors i ∈
CK(σ′), i.e. |Ci(σ′)| ≤ |Ci(σ)| for each i ∈ CK(σ′). Observe that this implies
also that CK(σ′) ⊆ CK(σ).
By summing up over all colors in CK(σ), we have that:∑
i∈CK(σ)
|Ci(σ)| =
∑
i∈CK(σ)
|Ci(σ′)| = |C|
and as a consequence we get |Ci(σ)| = |Ci(σ′)| for all i ∈ CK(σ) that is exactly
(i). Thus we can rewrite Equation (2) as:
0 < cu(σ)− cu(σ′) ≤ 1
which implies (ii).
We now prove (iii). We note that:
cu(σ′) = |{(u, v)|v /∈ C, σ′(v) = ν}|+ |{(u, v)|v ∈ C \ {u}, σ′(v) = ν}|
= |{(u, v)|v /∈ C, σ(v) = ν}|+ |Cν(σ′)| − 1
= |{(u, v)|v /∈ C, σ(v) = ν}|+ |Cν(σ)| − 1
= cu(σ−u, ν)− 1
where in the last but on equality we used (i). Since by (ii) we know that cu(σ) =
cu(σ′) + 1, we can conclude (iii).
Proof of Proposition 7
Fig. 3: Instance G and coloring σ for which the minimal strong improvement
strictly decreases the cut-value.
Consider the graph G and a coloring σ. Both are depicted in Figure 3. K7
denotes a clique composed by nodes a, b, . . . , g. Due to space shortage, only the
needed edges are explicitly reported. Regarding the omitted edges, we assume
that (i) none of the non-labelled nodes vertices desire to change color, (ii) node
g does not want to deviate to any other color, (iii) nodes h, i, l,m, n, and o have
sufficient edges towards all the other colors, except color 1, to prevent them from
deviating to such colors, and (iiii) a, b, c, d, e, and f have sufficient edges towards
all the other colors, except colors 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively, to prevent them
from deviating to such colors. Given these assumptions, the only minimal coali-
tion that can perform an improving move is C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, h, i, l,m, n, o}.
In fact, a has six edges towards both color 1 and color 2, thus it is willing to
deviate to color 2 only one of its neighbors leaves that color. Node h has one
edge towards color 2 and two edges towards nodes a and b, that are colored 1.
Thus, h moves to color 1 only if players a and b deviate. Similarly to node a, b
deviates to color 3 only if i changes color, and so on and so forth. Finally, player
o deviates to color 1 only if a and f change color. To sum up, the coloring σ′
obtained after C’s deviation is such that σ′(a) = 2, σ′(b) = 3, σ′(c) = 4, σ′(d) =
5, σ′(e) = 6, σ′(f) = 7, σ′(h) = . . . = σ′(o) = 1, while the other nodes’ strategies
remain unchanged. It is not difficult to check that Φ(σ′) − Φ(σ) = −3 that is,
Φ’s value strictly decreases even after a strong minimal improvement.
Proof of Proposition 8
Fig. 4: A coalition C whose size is upper-bounded as defined in Proposition 8
has at most two cycles.
Let σ∗ be an optimal coloring and let C be a minimal coalition that deviates
from σ∗ to σ′, where |C| ≤ (2ρ(G)− 3). Let us consider how many cycles there
can be at most in G(C) according to |C|.
– Trivially, if |C| < ρ(G) then G(C) must not contain any cycle;
– If |C| ≥ ρ(G) then G(C) can contain at least one cycle;
– Given a cycle, since it has length at least ρ(G) there always exist a pair of
nodes u, v, such that distG(C)(u, v) ≥ bρ(G)/2c, that is the shortest path
between u and v is made of at least bρ(G)/2c + 1 nodes, u and v included.
Thus, by having at least dρ(G)/2e − 1 new nodes then G(C) is allowed to
have a second cycle that makes use of the shortest path between u and v;
– Since |C| ≤ (2ρ(G)− 3), any coalition C cannot contain more than two
cycles in G(C), otherwise there would be a cycle of length strictly less than
ρ(G).
Let us assume that G(C) contains two cycles c1, c2 with some nodes in common.
Let u and v be the first and last node in the intersection of the cycles, respectively.
Moreover, since there cannot be any more cycles, each node of the cycles can be
the root of a (possible empty) tree of deviating players (if we do not consider
the other nodes in the cycles). A sketch of G(C) is depicted in Figure 4.
First, we know from Proposition 1 that the deviation performed by a player
w that belongs to C but not to c1 and c2 always increases the size of the cut.
If it was not so then it would mean that w is not increasing its utility because,
since it does not belong to any of the cycles, its adjacent players who deviate
always select a color different from its own in σ′, otherwise some node could be
removed from C, contradicting the minimality assumption.
Let w ∈ c1∪ c2 be a node that belongs to one of the two cycles. The only w’s
deviating neighbors that can be in the same color as w in σ′ are the ones that
belong to c1 or c2. In fact, if there is a node x that is adjacent to w, is not in c1
or c2 and σ′(x) = σ′(w), then by removing from C the subtree with root x we
still have a deviating coalition. For the same reason, there cannot be a deviating
node x that is adjacent to w, is not in c1 and c2 and such that σ∗(w) = σ∗(x),
because w does not need x to deviate. Therefore, we can assume in the following
that C is composed only of c1 and c2.
Node w must have at least one adjacent node x colored differently from it
in σ∗, that is σ∗(w) 6= σ∗(x), otherwise w would have no reason to deviate
jointly because it could perform a Nash deviation itself. Moreover, since (i)
2 ≤ δw(G(C)) ≤ 3 ∀w ∈ C, (ii) each deviating player has at least one proper
edge in G(C) with respect to σ, (iii) by Lemma 1, players with degree 2 cannot
share the same color with some other deviating nodes in σ′, otherwise they
could have deviated alone, and (iiii) there are only two not-neighboring players
u, v with degree 3 in G(C), it must necessarily be that no edge in G(C) is
monochromatic with respect to σ′. Moreover, the difference between the number
of properly colored edges incident to w ∈ C, where δw(G(C)) = 2, and towards
nodes outside C in σ′ and σ∗, respectively, is greater or equal than 0. This is
true otherwise w’s utility has not strictly improved after the deviation, since w
can improve its utility by at most 1 from the deviation of its neighbors because
σ∗ is Nash stable by definition. Thus, the deviating players with degree in C
equal to 2 contributes to the cut a total of |C| − 2 edges, since they all improve
their utility by 1 each. Since we know from Theorem 4 that σ∗ is a 5-SE, we can
assume |C| > 5, that is more than three edges enters the cut. On the other hand,
the only two nodes u, v with degree δu(G(C)) = δv(G(C)) = 3 can decrease the
number of the edges in the cut and towards nodes not in the coalition by at most
1 each. This is true otherwise if one of them decreases the cut-value by at least
2 then it does not strictly improve its utility. Thus, the cut-value increases, but
this contradicts the fact that σ∗ is optimal.
Appendix B
In this section we show that the inclusions depicted in Figure 2 are all proper.
Fig. 5: An example of an NE which is not a 2-SE in the Max-Cut game.
First we give an example of NE which is not a 2-SE in the Max-Cut game.
The example is shown in Figure 5. The strategy profile σ is an NE, but the
couple {c, d} can improve their utility by deviating to σ′.
a
b
c
de
f
(a) Initial strategy profile.
a
b
c
de
f
(b) Strategy profile after
the deviation of b, d and e.
Fig. 6: Example of a 2-SE which is not an LSE in the Max-3-Cut game.
In Figure 6 we have an example of a 2-SE (Figure 6a) which is not an LSE.
Figure 6b shows a profitable deviation of players b, d and e, which form a clique
of three nodes. Thus the initial strategy profile is not a LSE.
Now we show an example of a LSE being not a k-SE. In the following example
k = 3. The example is given in Figure 7. It is easy to check that the strategy
profile shown in Figure 7a is an NE. Moreover, the nodes a, d, g, i, m have the
highest possible utility, thus no deviating coalition can contain them, included
the two cliques of 3 nodes. All possible couples either contain one of the players
mentioned above, or does not satisfy the conditions given in 2, thus they do not
profit deviating. Thus, the strategy profile is an LSE. On the other hand, if e
and f change to blue and c to yellow they all improve by 1 their payoff. Thus
{c, e, f } is a non-local coalition which breaks the equilibrium.
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(a) Initial strategy profile.
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(b) Strategy profile after the
deviation of c, e and f.
Fig. 7: Example of a LSE which is not a 3-SE in the Max-3-Cut game.
There is only one case left. In Figure 8 is given an instance of the Max-Cut
game along with a 2-SE which is not an SE (if A, B and C deviate in the only
possible way they all improve their utility by 1).
A
B C
Fig. 8: Example of a 2-SE which is not an SE in the Max-Cut game.
